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Abstract
In this paper, we formulate and analyze the problem of secure control in the
context of networked linear parameter varying (LPV) systems. We consider an
energy-constrained, pulse-width modulated (PWM) jammer, which corrupts the
control communication channel by performing a denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
In particular, the malicious attacker is able to erase the data sent to one or more
actuators. In order to achieve secure control, we propose a virtual actuator tech-
nique under the assumption that the behavior of the attacker has been identified.
The main advantage brought by this technique is that the existing components in
the control system can be maintained without need of retuning them, since the vir-
tual actuator will perform a reconfiguration of the plant, hiding the attack from the
controller point of view. Using Lyapunov-based results that take into account the
possible behavior of the attacker, design conditions for calculating the virtual ac-
tuators gains are obtained. A numerical example is used to illustrate the proposed
secure control strategy.
Keywords: Cyber-physical systems, cyber attacks, denial-of-service, energy
constraints, networked control systems, linear parameter varying systems,
switched systems, virtual actuators.
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1. Introduction
Modern control systems are composed of networked devices such as sensors,
actuators and controllers, which transmit their information across a communica-
tion network [1]. Hence, networked control systems (NCSs) [2, 3] have become
essential for controlling critical infrastructures, such as water distribution systems
[4, 5] and smart grids [6]. However, in addition to being prone to failures as any
other system, NCSs are also vulnerable to cyber attacks [7, 8], which affect the
data management or communication layer, and introduce significant difficulties to
secure and protect them [9, 10].
Over the last decades, concerns about the security of NCSs have been raised
and related problems have been studied from the control theory point of view, with
the application of fault diagnosis [11, 12] and fault tolerant control (FTC) [13, 14]
techniques. Fault diagnosis techniques are used to detect, isolate and estimate
faults, while FTC techniques are used to maintain the performance close to the
desired one and preserve stability conditions despite the fault occurrence. It is
worthwhile to highlight that a fault is considered a physical event that affects the
system behavior, does not have an objective to fulfill and is a random event. On
the other hand, cyber attacks are deliberate, performed in an intelligent way, and
can spread in the network within seconds. Even though the existing fault diagnosis
and FTC techniques can be a first action to face cyber attacks, the development
of new tools, security mechanisms and algorithms is needed in order to address
simultaneously physical and cyber disruptions, while also exploiting some known
information about the attacker’s behavior [15].
Cyber attacks can be classified into deception and denial-of-service (DoS) at-
tacks (a.k.a. jamming attacks) [16]. Deception attacks refer to the possibility of
compromising the integrity of control packets or measurements by altering the be-
havior of sensors and/or actuators [1, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]; on the other hand, DoS
attacks compromise the availability of resources, impeding the exchange of infor-
mation between two entities by jamming the communication [22]. In this paper,
we focus on DoS attacks, which are the most likely threat to NCSs, considering
that some of them may be damaged and even become unstable, when affected by
this kind of attack.
The design of detection and secure control strategies against DoS attacks has
been investigated during the recent years. [16] and [23] have addressed the prob-
lem of finding optimal control and attack strategies assuming a maximum number
of jamming actions over a prescribed control horizon for a resource-constrained
attacker. Moreover, [23] used game theory to design the jamming attack strategy,
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by presenting a zero sum game to depict the combat between a controller and
a strategic jammer. In [24], an integrated game-theoretic framework was devel-
oped to investigate the interactive decision making process between a sensor node
and an attacker who can launch DoS attacks. The works [25, 26] have developed
an explicit characterization of DoS frequency and duration for which closed-loop
stability can be preserved by means of state feedback controllers. [27, 28] evalu-
ated the effect of energy-constrained DoS attacks against linear quadratic gaussian
(LQG) control and proposed the optimal DoS attack scheduling which can max-
imize the LQG cost. [29, 30] have studied pulse-width modulated (PWM) jam-
mers attacking the control signals, for which the attack duration in each period is
varying, while the attack frequency is fixed and known. On the other hand, [31]
considered a DoS attack on the sensor signal, for which both the frequency of the
attack and the duration were time-varying. The recent work [32] has addressed the
distributed resilient filtering problem for a class of power systems subject to DoS
attacks. Furthermore, [33] has proposed an event-triggered estimator design for
cyber-physical systems with limited communication resources, sensor saturation
and DoS attacks.
Note that in all the above works secure control (or estimation) against DoS
attacks is achieved by considering an appropriate controller or observer that takes
into account assumptions about the attacks during the design phase. However,
in case a set of control system components is already available, it might be of
interest to preserve them and achieve secure control by adding new components
instead of replacing the existing ones. To this end, the active FTC technique
known as virtual actuator might be of interest, since it is based on the idea of per-
forming a reconfiguration of the plant when an unexpected situation occurs, such
that the nominal controller can still be used without need of retuning it. Initially
proposed for linear time invariant (LTI) systems [34], virtual actuators were later
extended to linear parameter varying (LPV) [35, 36], hybrid [37], Takagi-Sugeno
[38], piecewise affine [39], Hammerstein-Weiner [40], Lipschitz [41] and uncer-
tain [42] systems. Note that the virtual actuator technique belongs to the wider
class of fault-hiding reconfiguration approaches, among which there is the dual
technique known as virtual sensors, that is employed when the considered faults
affect the sensor outputs [43].
In this paper, we consider a remote control architecture in which the operator
(remote control unit) uses a control channel to send wirelessly a control command
to the actuators acting on a possibly unstable plant [29]. We would like to remark
that such an architecture is more vulnerable to DoS attacks than co-located archi-
tectures (control unit co-located with the actuators), but does not require wired or
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Figure 1: Schematic of the overall secure control architecture.
dedicated actuator channels, such that it might be preferred because of flexibility
or economic issues [44]. Within this architecture, we consider that an attacker
wishes to induce instability in the control system by denying communication on
the control channel [26], and for this reason, we wish to introduce a virtual ac-
tuator in the loop in order to preserve stability in spite of the attacks (see Fig.
1 for a schematic of the overall architecture). We would like to point out that
so far, the virtual actuator technique has been investigated under the assumption
that persistent faults affect the actuators, which makes the design somehow sim-
pler. However, when secure control against DoS attacks is of interest, a common
assumption is that the attacker cannot disrupt persistently a communication chan-
nel, since it has a limited amount of available energy to perform the attack. As a
consequence, state-of-the-art virtual actuator design methodologies are conserva-
tive, since they do not take into account the constraints brought by the attacker’s
behavior.
The main objective and contribution of this paper is to develop an approach
for the design of virtual actuators for the secure control against DoS attacks per-
formed by a PWM jammer that overcomes the above-mentioned conservativeness
under the assumption that some information about the energy constraints that limit
the attacker has been identified. In the proposed approach, the attacked system is
modeled as a switched system [45], in which the different modes correspond to
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different sets of actuators being affected by the attack. Then, following some ideas
proposed by [46], the design conditions are obtained by allowing the reconfigured
closed-loop system under some attack conditions to not satisfy the desired speci-
fication (stability with prescribed decay rate), as long as the resulting effect on the
used Lyapunov function is compensated by the behavior of the closed-loop sys-
tem during the time in which other operating conditions hold, e.g. no attack being
performed. The obtained conditions, which are based on multiple Lyapunov ma-
trices, recall the ones available in the literature concerning the stability of switched
systems with average dwell-time, see e.g. [47, 48, 49, 50], although they actually
differ and are less conservative because they exploit useful information about the
mode transitions provided by the constraints of the jamming policy. With the aim
of enlarging the applicability of the developed approach, the virtual actuator-based
secure control will be formulated within the LPV framework, which allows deal-
ing with nonlinear systems using an extension of linear techniques [51, 52, 53].
Simulation results obtained with a numerical example are used to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed approach, as well as its most relevant features.
We would like to point out the existence of strong similarities between the
PWM DoS attacks considered in this paper and other undesired phenomena that
can affect NCSs. In particular, some works have investigated the case of intermit-
tent faults [54, 55] within a stochastic framework, e.g., modeling the faulty system
as a Markovian jump system [56, 57], contrarily to the approach developed in this
paper, which makes deterministic assumptions about the attacker’s behavior. An-
other similar problem investigated in the literature concerns the stabilization of
NCSs under packet loss [58, 59], for which both stochastic and deterministic set-
tings have been considered. In this latter case, however, the usual assumption is
the existence of a fixed upper bound on the number of packets that could be not
received by the actuators. On the other hand, the DoS attacks investigated in this
paper are considered to be performed on purpose by an attacker who has some
available amount of energy. Hence, the attacker could potentially choose between
disabling permanently a small set of actuators or disrupt periodically for a shorter
amount of time a wider set of actuators, which require different actions by the
virtual actuators in order to maintain the overall stability of the NCS.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the problem formulation.
Then, in Section 3, the main concepts related to the virtual actuator technique
are discussed, while in Section 4, the design conditions for the virtual actuator
gains are described. Simulation results are shown in Section 5. Finally, the main
conclusions are summarized in Section 6.
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2. Problem formulation
Let us consider an LPV system described by the following state equation:
x˙(t) = A(θ(t))x(t)+B(θ(t))u(t) (1)
where x(t) ∈ Rnx is the state vector, u(t) ∈ Rnu is the input vector, and A(θ(t)) ∈
Rnx×nx , B(θ(t)) ∈ Rnx×nu are time-varying matrices, whose values depend on the
vector of varying parameters θ(t) ∈Θ⊂ Rnθ .
The LPV system (1) is controlled by a state feedback control law:
uc(t) = K (θ(t))x(t) (2)
where K (θ(t)) ∈ Rnu×nx is the LPV controller gain, which we assume that has
been designed to ensure quadratic stability with a desired decay rate α < 0 (in
the following, this specification will be referred to as quadratic α-stability) of
the closed-loop system obtained with u(t) = uc(t). This means that there exists a
symmetric matrix P 0 such that ∀θ ∈Θ:
He{(A(θ)+B(θ)K(θ))P}−αP≺ 0 (3)
where, for a given matrix A, He(A) = A+AT .
Note that the quadratic α-stability specification corresponds to the Lyapunov
function V (x(t)) = x(t)T P−1x(t) satisfying:
V˙ (x(t))
V (x(t))
< α ∀t ∈ R (4)
and, by considering a time interval [t, t+h]:
V (x(t+h))< eαhV (x(t)) (5)
In this paper, it is assumed that the signal u(t) is sent to the actuators through
a network, that can be affected by DoS attacks, by means of which an adversary
can destabilize the plant. More specifically, similarly to [23, 60], we assume that
a malicious attacker performs a jamming attack in which (s)he is able to erase the
data sent to one or more actuators. This type of attack can be modeled as a change
in the input matrix of (1), such that the jammed system becomes:
x˙(t) = A(θ(t))x(t)+Ba (θ(t),γ(t))u(t) (6)
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with:
Ba (θ(t),γ(t)) = B(θ(t))Γ(γ(t)) (7)
Γ(γ(t)) = diag(γ1(t), . . . ,γnu(t)) , γi(t) ∈ {0,1} (8)
where γi(t) = 1 represents the availability of the i-th actuator, whereas γi(t) = 0
indicates that the i-th actuator is not available anymore due to the jamming attack.
We consider an energy-constrained, PWM jammer such that the signals γi(t)
satisfy [29]:
γi(t) =
{
1 if(n−1)h≤ t ≤ (n−1)h+ ti(n)
0 if(n−1)h+ ti(n)< t < nh (9)
where n ∈ N is the period number, h > 0, and [0,h] is the action-period of the
jammer. Also, ∀n ∈ N and ∀i = 1, . . . ,nu, ti(n) ∈ [0,h] denotes the time instant
in which the jamming attack on the i-th input channel begins, while τi(n) > 0
will indicate the duration of the time interval during which the i-th actuator is not
available, obviously related to ti(n) by the relation:
τi(n) = h− ti(n) (10)
We assume that, due to the above mentioned energy constraints, a known uni-
form bound τ¯ for ∑nui=1 τi(n) exists, i.e.:
∑nui=1 τi(n)≤ τ¯ < nuh (11)
which holds for all the periods (∀n ∈ N).
Let us recall that, given the set of actuators s0 (nominal or full configuration)
with cardinality nu, a configuration is a subset of actuators s j, j = 0,1, . . . ,2nu−1
(configuration j). Then, the set of all the configurations, denoted with L (s0), is
the power set of s0 and is a lattice, which can be represented by a non-directed
graph whose vertices are the configurations [61].
It is straightforward to realize that, at each time t, the value of the signal γ(t)
selects a specific configuration s(t) fromL (s0). In the following, we will denote
as B j (θ(t)) the value of the input matrix Ba (θ(t),γ(t)) arising from γ(t) selecting
the configuration s j ∈L (s0) and, similarly, as B0 (θ(t)) the value of the input ma-
trix corresponding to the configuration s0, i.e. the nominal input matrix B(θ(t)).
Under the assumption that an estimation sˆ(t) of s(t) is available, we consider the
control law:
u(t) =
{
uc(t) if sˆ(t) = s0
u( j)f (t) if sˆ(t) = s j, j = 1, . . . ,2
nu−1 (12)
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The problem considered in this paper is the design of u( j)f (t), j= 1, . . . ,2
nu−1,
in order to ensure the average quadratic α∗-stability with α ≤ α∗ < 0 for any sig-
nal γ(t) satisfying (9) (when the strict inequality holds, performance degradation
with respect to the nominal performances is allowed).
Note that the term average has been used, in the sense that we will not require
a constraint on the derivative of the Lyapunov function that holds ∀t ∈ R, as in
(4), but a weaker constraint on the decay of the Lyapunov function over a period
of the jamming attack [(n−1)h,nh]:
V (x(nh))< eα
∗hV (x((n−1)h)) (13)
In other words, similarly to [46], brief periods of α∗-instability are allowed,
as long as their effect on V (x(t)) is compensated by a stronger-than-α∗-stability
during the remaining length of the action-period of the jammer.
In the remaining of the paper, in order to keep the mathematical formulation
relatively simple, we will assume that an ideal jamming diagnosis algorithm is
available, and we will develop the virtual actuator-based attack-hiding strategy
under the assumption that sˆ(t) = s(t). Considering a mismatch sˆ(t) , s(t), al-
though possible as, e.g., taking into account the results in [62], would increase the
overall complexity and mathematical burden of the proposed solution, and goes
beyond the scope of this paper.
3. Virtual actuator-based attack-hiding strategy
In this paper, the solution to the problem formulated in the previous section
relies on the use of the virtual actuator technique. The main idea of this technique
is to perform a reconfiguration of the plant such that the nominal controller can
still be used without need of retuning it. The plant with the jammed actuators is
modified adding the virtual actuator block, whose purpose is to hide the attack
from the controller point of view (see Fig. 2 for a conceptual scheme).
More specifically, we employ an LPV virtual actuator whose structure is in-
spired by the one in [35], with the remarkable difference that it varies online de-
pending on the specific value of sˆ(t), i.e. when sˆ(t) = s j, then:
x˙v(t) =
(
A(θ(t))+B∗j (θ(t))M j (θ(t))
)
xv(t) (14)
+
(
B(θ(t))−B∗j (θ(t))
)
[uc(t)+K (θ(t))xv(t)]
where xv(t)∈Rnx is the virtual actuator state, for which an initial condition xv(0)=
0 is chosen, and M j (θ(t)) ∈ Rnu×nx denotes the virtual actuator gains. The matrix
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Figure 2: Conceptual scheme of the proposed attack-hiding strategy.
functions B∗j (θ(t)) are calculated as:
B∗j (θ(t)) = B j (θ(t))N j (θ(t)) (15)
with:
N j (θ(t)) = B j (θ(t))† B(θ(t)) (16)
where † denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse.
Then, u( j)f (t) in (12) is selected as follows:
u( j)f (t) = N j (θ(t))
(
uc(t)+K (θ(t))xv(t)−M j (θ(t))xv(t)
)
(17)
Thanks to the introduction of the virtual actuator block, the separation prin-
ciple holds for the augmented system made up by the LPV system and the LPV
virtual actuator, i.e. the augmented system can be brought to a block-triangular
form, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider the augmented system made up by the LPV system’s state
equation (6) with Ba (θ(t),γ(t)) = B j (θ(t)), the control law (12) with uc(t) as in
(2) and u( j)f (t) as in (17), and the LPV virtual actuator’s state equation (14):(
x˙(t)
x˙v(t)
)
= Ξ(θ(t))
(
x(t)
xv(t)
)
(18)
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Ξ(θ) =
(
A(θ)+B∗j(θ)K(θ) Ξx(θ)
Ξv(θ) A(θ)+B∗j(θ)M j(θ)+Ξv(θ)
)
(19)
Ξx(θ) =
{
0
B∗j(θ)
[
K(θ)−M j(θ)
] if sˆ(t) = s0
if sˆ(t) = s j, j = 1, . . . ,2nu−1
Ξv(θ) =
{
0[
B(θ)−B∗j(θ)
]
K(θ)
if sˆ(t) = s0
if sˆ(t) = s j, j = 1, . . . ,2nu−1
Then, there exists a similarity transformation such that the state matrix of the
augmented system in the new state variables is block-triangular, as follows:
Ξz(θ) =
(
A(θ)+B(θ)K(θ) 0
Ξv(θ) A(θ)+B∗j(θ)M j(θ)
)
(20)
Proof: It follows from considering the change of variables:(
z(t)
xv(t)
)
= T
(
x(t)
xv(t)
)
=
(
I I
0 I
)(
x(t)
xv(t)
)
Then:
Ξz (θ(t)) = TΞ(θ(t))T−1
with Ξz(θ) given by (20). 
The following theorem shows that for continuous-time LPV systems in block-
triangular form, the quadratic α-stability can be obtained from the quadratic α-
stability of the subsystems in the diagonal.
Theorem 2. Consider the following continuous-time LPV system:
x˙(t) = Ξ(θ(t))x(t) =
(
Ξ11 (θ(t)) 0
Ξ21 (θ(t)) Ξ22 (θ(t))
)
x(t) (21)
and assume that the subsystems x˙1(t)=Ξ11 (θ(t))x1(t) and x˙2(t)=Ξ22 (θ(t))x2(t)
are quadratically α-stable, with α ∈ R. Then, (21) is quadratically α-stable.
Proof: The quadratic α-stability of x˙1(t) = Ξ11 (θ(t)) implies the existence of
a symmetric matrix P1  0 such that ∀θ ∈Θ:
Ξ11(θ)P1+P1Ξ11(θ)T −αP1 ≺ 0 (22)
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Similarly, the quadratic α-stability of x˙2(t) = Ξ22 (θ(t)) implies the existence of
a symmetric matrix P2  0 such that ∀θ ∈Θ:
Ξ22(θ)P2+P2Ξ22(θ)T −αP2 ≺ 0 (23)
In the following, it is proved that there exists ε > 0 such that:
P =
(
P1 0
0 εP2
)
 0 (24)
satisfies:
Ξ(θ)P+PΞ(θ)T −αP≺ 0 (25)
In fact, (24) and (25) lead to the equivalent matrix inequality:(
Ξ11(θ)P1+P1Ξ11(θ)T −αP1
Ξ21(θ)P1
P1Ξ21(θ)T
ε
(
Ξ22(θ)P2+P2Ξ22(θ)T −αP2
) )≺ 0
(26)
that, using Schur complements, is equivalent to (22) and:
ε
(
Ξ22(θ)P2+P2Ξ22(θ)T −αP2
)
−Ξ21(θ)P1
(
Ξ11(θ)P1+P1Ξ11(θ)T −αP1
)−1
P1Ξ21(θ)T ≺ 0 (27)
Since (23) holds ∀θ ∈ Θ, the proof is completed by showing that, given a matrix
Z ≺ 0 and a matrix W of the same order, there exists ε > 0 such that εZ−W ≺ 0.
In fact, for any vector v:
vT Zv≤ σZ‖v‖2
vTWv≤ σW‖v‖2
where σZ and σW denote the maximum eigenvalues of Z and W , with σZ < 0 due
to the negative definiteness of Z. Hence, vT (εZ−W )v ≤ (εσZ −σW )‖v‖2 and
(εσZ−σW )‖v‖2 < 0 when εσZ < σW . Hence, εσZ−σW < 0 from the definition
of negative definite matrix, which completes the proof. 
The theoretical result given in Theorem 2 is important because, when com-
bined with Theorem 1, shows that, due to the introduction of the virtual actua-
tor block which hides the attack, the average quadratic α∗-stability of the aug-
mented system (the problem formulated in the previous section) can be achieved
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as long as the virtual actuator gains M j(θ) are designed such that the system
x˙v(t) =
(
A(θ(t))+B∗j (θ(t))M j (θ(t))
)
xv(t) is quadratically α∗-stable for each
j = 0, . . . ,2nu−1. However, this is not always possible. For example, let us con-
sider the case in which A(θ) is unstable. Then, for the configuration correspond-
ing to all-jammed actuators (γi = 1∀i = 1, . . . ,nu), B∗j(θ) = 0, which means that it
is impossible to achieve the quadratic α∗-stability of x˙v(t)=
(
A(θ(t))+B∗j (θ(t))
M j (θ(t))
)
xv(t). Luckily, the information about the jamming attack policy (9) can
be exploited in order to obtain design conditions that allow achieving the desired
specification of average quadratic α∗-stability in spite of the possible loss of sta-
bilizability caused by the jamming attack.
4. Design conditions
In order to obtain design conditions for the virtual actuator gains, first let us
provide the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let us consider the switched LPV system:
x˙(t) = Aγ(t) (θ(t))x(t) (28)
where Aγ is a function that assigns to each γ∗ ∈L (γ)= {0,1}× . . .×{0,1}⊂Nnu
an LPV system x˙(t) = Aγ∗ (θ(t))x(t), and let us denote asLk(γ), k= 0, . . . ,nu, the
sets of γ∗ ∈L (γ) with k elements equal to 0 (obviously,
nu⋃
k=0
Lk(γ) =L (γ)), and
as L γ
∗
k→k+1(γ), k = 0, . . . ,nu− 1, the set of γ∗∗ ∈ Lk+1(γ) that can be obtained
from γ∗ ∈ Lk(γ) by changing one, and only one, of the 1 into 0. Moreover, let
α∗ ∈ R and let γ(t) satisfy the energy-constrained, PWM jamming policy defined
by (9)-(11). If there exist 2nu symmetric matrices Pγ∗  0, γ∗ ∈L (γ), and scalars
αk,µk ∈ R with µk > 1, k = 0, . . . ,nu, such that:
nu
∑
k=0
ln(µk)+αh ≤ α∗h (29)
Pγ∗∗  µkPγ∗ ∀γ∗ ∈Lk(γ),∀γ∗∗ ∈L γ
∗
k→k+1(γ) (30)
P{1,1,...,1}  µnuP{0,0,...,0} (31)
Aγ∗(θ)Pγ∗+Pγ∗Aγ∗(θ)T −αkPγ∗ ≺ 0 ∀γ∗ ∈Lk(γ),∀θ ∈Θ (32)
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with αh defined as:
αh = max
τ∗1 , . . . ,τ
∗
nu
s.t.
{ nu
∑
k=1
kτ∗k≤τ¯
τ∗k≥0 ∀k∈{1,...,nu}
α0 (h− τ∗1 )+
nu−1
∑
k=1
αk
(
τ∗k − τ∗k+1
)
+αnuτ
∗
nu (33)
then the switched LPV system (28) is quadratically α∗-stable in average over the
period [(n−1)h,nh].
Proof: Let us consider the Lyapunov function V (x(t)) = x(t)T P−1{1,1,...,1}x(t),
and let us denote as t∗k (n) ∈ [0,h], k = 0, . . . ,nu, the time relative to the interval
[(n− 1)h,nh] starting from which k elements of γ(t) are equal to 0. Then, the
following holds due to (30)-(32):
V (x(nh))<
nu
∏
k=0
µk
(
nu−1
∏
k=0
eαk(t
∗
k+1(n)−t∗k (n))
)
eαnu(h−t
∗
nu(n))V (x((n−1)h)) (34)
By combining (34) with (13), it follows that quadratic α∗-stability in average is
achieved if:
nu
∑
k=0
ln(µk)+
nu−1
∑
k=0
αk
(
t∗k+1(n)− t∗k (n)
)
+αnu
(
h− t∗nu(n)
)≤ α∗h (35)
which, by denoting as τ∗k (n) ≥ 0 the duration of the time interval during which k
elements of γ(t) are equal to 0, can be rewritten as:
nu
∑
k=0
ln(µk)+α0 (h− τ∗1 (n))+
nu−1
∑
k=1
αk
(
τ∗k (n)− τ∗k+1(n)
)
+αnuτ
∗
nu(n)≤ α∗h (36)
From (11), it follows that:
nu
∑
k=0
kτ∗k (n)≤ τ¯ (37)
Hence, since αh is defined as in (33), if (29) holds, then (35) holds as well, which
completes the proof. 
Note that Theorem 3 recalls similar results available in the literature about
switched systems, that make use of the concept of average dwell-time in order to
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assess stability or other specifications, see e.g. [47]. However, a relevant differ-
ence is that Theorem 3 is less conservative because it exploits useful information
about the mode transitions provided by the constraints of the jamming policy. On
the basis of Theorems 1-3, the following corollary can be provided for the design
of the virtual actuator gains.
Corollary 1. Let α∗ ∈ R and let γ(t) satisfy the energy-constrained, PWM jam-
ming policy defined by (9)-(11). If there exist 2nu symmetric matrices Pγ∗  0,
γ∗ ∈L (γ), and scalars αk,µk ∈ R with µk > 1, k = 0, . . . ,nu, such that (29)-(31)
hold with αh defined as in (33) and ∀ j ∈ {0, . . . ,2nu−1}, ∀θ ∈Θ:
He{A(θ)Pj +B∗j(θ)Γ j(θ)}−αk( j)Pj ≺ 0 (38)
where k( j) corresponds to the number of jammed actuators in the configuration s j,
then the augmented system made up by the LPV system’s state equation (6) with
Ba (θ(t),γ(t)) = B j (θ(t)), the control law (12) with uc(t) as in (2) and u
( j)
f (t)
as in (17), and the LPV virtual actuator’s state equation (14), with the virtual
actuator gains given by M j (θ(t)) = Γ j (θ(t))P−1j , is quadratically α
∗-stable in
average over the period [(n−1)h,nh].
Proof: It follows from Theorems 1-3 by considering the change of variables
Γ j(θ) = M j(θ)Pj. 
The main difficulty using Corollary 1 for design is the infinite number of con-
straints that (38) imposes. A common approach for obtaining a finite number of
LMIs, which are computationally tractable, is to consider polytopic models. Fol-
lowing [63], by considering an LPV system as in (1) for which the input matrix
is constant, i.e. B(θ(t)) = B ∀θ ∈ Θ, and the state matrix can be represented
by a parameter-varying convex combination of the so-called vertex matrices, as
follows:
A(θ(t)) =
N
∑
l=1
pil (θ(t))Al (39)
with: 
N
∑
l=1
pil (θ(t)) = 1
pil (θ(t))≥ 0
∀θ ∈Θ (40)
where pil, l = 1, . . . ,N denote the coefficients of the polytopic decomposition, and
N denotes the number of vertex matrices. Hence, by choosing the virtual actuator
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gains to be polytopic, with the same coefficients of (39):
M j (θ(t)) =
N
∑
l=1
pil (θ(t))M j,l (41)
Eq. (38) is equivalent to:
He{AlPj +B∗jΓ j,l}−αk( j)Pj ≺ 0 ∀l = 1, . . . ,N (42)
5. Numerical example
Let us consider an LPV system as in (1) with matrices:
A(θ(t)) =
 3+θ(t) 3 −5+θ(t)3+2θ(t) 3 −1
5 3−θ(t) −10
 B =
 10 17 4
2 1
 (43)
and θ(t) ∈ [1,2], for which a quadratic α-stabilizing controller has been designed
with α = −40, solving (3) using the YALMIP toolbox [64] with SeDuMi solver
[65]:
K (θ(t)) =
[ −6.70+0.20θ(t) 6.12−1.03θ(t) −26.22+2.63θ(t)
20.15+1.18θ(t) −32.58−3.23θ(t) 100.37+11.56θ(t)
]
(44)
The controlled system has an interesting property to show the relevant features
of our secure control approach: it becomes unstable in the case of a jamming
attack, independently from whether one or both control inputs are being made
unavailable by the jammer. In fact, Fig. 3 shows the real part of the dominant pole
of the closed-loop system, obtained for frozen values of the varying parameter
θ(t) and for the four possible configurations s0 = {1,1} (no jammed actuators),
s1 = {1,0} (jamming attack on the second actuator), s2 = {0,1} (jamming attack
on the first actuator), and s3 = {0,0} (all actuators jammed). It can be seen that for
all the configurations s1, s2, s3, and for all the values θ ∈ [1,2], the real part of the
dominant pole is positive which, through a frozen-value reasoning, is a sufficient
condition to state instability of the closed-loop system.
Let us consider an energy-constrained, PWM jammer described by (9)-(11)
with h = 7s and τ¯ = 9s, and let us apply Corollary 1 for the design of the virtual
actuator gains α∗ = 0, α0 =−40, α1 =−10, α2 = 20 and µ0 = µ1 = µ2 = 5. For
these values, (29) is verified with ∑nuk=0 ln(µk)+αh = −5.17 ≤ 0, and a feasible
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Figure 3: Real part of the dominant pole of the closed-loop system without secure control.
solution for (30)-(31) and (42) is obtained using YALMIP/Sedumi [64, 65], with
the symmetric matrices Pγ∗ , γ∗ ∈ {(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)}, given by:
P{0,0}=
 0.631 −0.018 −0.064−0.018 0.558 0.169
−0.064 0.169 0.074
 P{0,1}=
 0.788 0.421 0.1540.421 0.260 0.092
0.154 0.092 0.092

P{1,0} =
 0.064 0.246 0.0590.246 1.757 0.400
0.059 0.400 0.150
 P{1,1} =
 0.136 0.004 −0.0040.004 0.128 0.036
−0.004 0.036 0.059

and the virtual actuator gains obtained as M{1,1} (θ(t)) = 0 and:
M{0,0} (θ(t)) =
[ −3.99+0.03θ(t) 3.22−0.50θ(t) −10.87+1.18θ(t)
7.49+0.49θ(t) −12.24−1.86θ(t) 21.55+7.06θ(t)
]
M{0,1} (θ(t)) =
[
0.50+1.07θ(t) −3.66−2.48θ(t) 2.84+0.71θ(t)
1.02−0.09θ(t) 7.56−0.67θ(t) −25.95+2.30θ(t)
]
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Figure 4: State response in Scenario 1 with and without virtual actuators.
M{1,0} (θ(t)) =
[ −7.14−2.37θ(t) −1.48+0.23θ(t) 6.73+0.31θ(t)
1.45−0.61θ(t) 3.71−1.55θ(t) −17.17+7.18θ(t)
]
Let us consider the following two scenarios:
• Scenario 1: The jammer attacks alternatively the first and the second actu-
ator for the whole action-period [0,h];
• Scenario 2: In each action-period, no attack is performed in [0,h− 3τ¯/4].
Then, in [h− 3τ¯/4,h− τ¯/4], the jammer attacks alternatively the first and
the second actuator. Finally, in [h− τ¯/4,h], both actuators are affected by
the jamming attack.
For each scenario, a simulation lasting 5h = 35s, starting from the initial con-
dition x(0) = [1,1,1]T , and with a trajectory of the varying parameter given by
θ(t) = 1.5+ 0.5sin(2pit/3) has been obtained. Fig. 4 shows a comparison of
the state responses in Scenario 1 between the case without virtual actuators and
with virtual actuators. It can be seen that, in spite of clear instability in the case
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Figure 5: State response in Scenario 2 with and without virtual actuators.
without virtual actuators (blue line), the activation of the secure control technique
leads to stability of the closed-loop system in spite of the attack being performed
(red line). The same is true for Scenario 2 with the difference that some periods of
brief instability appear when both actuators are being attacked. However, thanks
to the virtual actuators, the closed-loop system remains stable in average.
Let us now consider a jammer which has less available energy to perform the
attack, represented by a lower value τ¯ = 5s. In this case, Corollary 1 can be
applied with α∗ = 0, α0 = −40, α1 = 10, α2 = 20 and µ0 = µ1 = µ2 = 5, thus
allowing for instability of the closed-loop system when even only one of the two
actuators is being attacked. For these values, (29) is verified with ∑nuk=0 ln(µk)+
αh = −0.17 ≤ 0 (presentation of the symmetric matrices Pγ∗ and virtual actuator
gains, which provide feasibility of (30)-(31) and (42), is omitted). For this case,
the following scenario will be considered in order to assess the performance of the
proposed secure control technique.
• Scenario 3: In each action-period, no attack is performed in [0,h− τ¯].
Then, in [h− τ¯,h], the jammer attacks the second actuator.
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Figure 6: State response in Scenario 3 with and without virtual actuators.
The state response for Scenario 3 is shown in Fig. 6. It can be seen that
without the virtual actuator strategy, the closed-loop system exhibits instability,
whereas for the case with virtual actuators, in spite of brief instabilities allowed
by the choice α1 = 10, the system remains stable in average. It is worth remarking
that in this case the role of the virtual actuator in the case of configuration s2 is to
reduce the real part of the dominant pole of the closed-loop system under attack,
as shown in Fig. 7, such that, roughly speaking, it presents a slower unstable
response than without the secure control technique.
Finally, in order to conclude the presentation of the proposed secure control
technique, let us analyze the evolution of the Lyapunov function V (x(t)) over dif-
ferent action-periods of the jammer, as shown in Fig. 8, where for the sake of
illustration, V (x(t)) has been normalized with respect to its value at the beginning
of each action-period, i.e., at t = (n−1)h. The figure shows that before the occur-
rence of the DoS attack, the Lyapunov function decreases monotonically, whereas
during the attack, it could increase again. However, in spite of the brief instabil-
ities induced by the attack, the Lyapunov function is overall decreasing over the
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Figure 7: Real part of the dominant pole of the closed-loop system with and without secure control
for the configuration s2.
action-period of the jammer.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered the secure control against DoS attacks us-
ing a virtual actuator-based strategy for networked LPV control systems in which
one or more actuators are lost during the attack. It has been shown that, thanks to
the introduction of the virtual actuator block, the separation principle holds for the
augmented system made up by the LPV plant plus the LPV virtual actuator, i.e. the
augmented system can be brought to a block-triangular form. As a consequence,
the design of the virtual actuator can be performed independently from the design
of the controller. More specifically, the design has been performed by requiring
that the desired specification (stability with prescribed decay rate of the Lyapunov
function) holds in average, which means that under some attack conditions the
reconfigured closed-loop system is allowed to infringe upon the desired specifi-
cation, as long as the resulting effect of such violation on the Lyapunov function
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Figure 8: Evolution of the Lyapunov function over different action-periods of the jammer.
is compensated by the behavior under the remaining conditions. By taking into
account some information about the energy constraints that limit the attacker, it is
possible to obtain design conditions based on multiple Lyapunov matrices, which
allow calculating the virtual actuator gains in order to achieve the desired specifi-
cation. Simulation results obtained with a numerical example have demonstrated
the effectiveness of the proposed approach, as well as its most relevant features.
Future work will aim at extending the virtual actuator-based secure control
strategy to other types of cyber attacks, as well as to other possible jamming poli-
cies and to the case in which the identification of the attacker’s behavior is delayed
in time. Moreover, the case where the sensor-to-controller channel can be attacked
will be considered by means of the virtual sensor approach. Finally, validation of
the proposed approach with practically motivated problems, such as secure control
of multi-agent systems, will be also addressed by future research.
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